The Effect of State Economic Conditions on Gubernatorial Elections: Does Unified Government Make a Difference?” Political Research Quarterly 48

This research addresses two questions of current interest in American po-litics: Does divided government reduce accountability? Do voters reward or punish incumbent governors and/or their parties on the basis of state economic performance? A multivariate pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of aggregate election outcomes from 1972-91 in forty-three states reveals that the effect of state unemployment on the incumbent guber-natorial party’s vote percentage is greatly enhanced when the governor’s party controls both chambers of the state legislature. This evidence is con-sistent with the claim made by responsible party theorists that voters are more able and/or willing to reward or punish a political party when that party’s responsibility for government performance is complete. Does divided government make a difference? This question has been asked and debated for much of the history of American political science. While we now know that divided government is much more common than in the past (Fiorina 1992), and some of the reasons why we have divided control of govemment Qacobson 1990; and Fiorina 1992), the actual consequences of unified vs. divided government are still a matter of controversy. Central to all of these discussions is whether or not divided government is inherently healthy for a democratic system. The purpose of this article is to explore empirically one of the fundamen-tal questions in the debate over divided government, a question that is derived from the normative concerns over the desirability of &dquo;responsible government:&dquo